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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
People v. Cortes'
(decided May 26, 2004)
Eugenio Cortes was prosecuted for attempted murder in the
second degree, attempted assault in the first degree and other
associated charges in relation to the shooting of Huston Pondexter.2
At trial, the prosecution sought to admit into evidence two taped
911-telephone calls made by witnesses to the shooting.3 Although
one witness was available for cross-examination at trial, the other
caller remained anonymous.4 The court considered whether under
the federal and New York State constitutional right to
confrontation,5  recordings of 911 calls reporting crimes are
considered testimonial evidence and consequently inadmissible
when the accuser does not have an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness.6 The court held in the affirmative stating that 911
reports were testimonial in nature and subject to the Confrontation
Clause.7 Accordingly, the court barred admission of one 911 tape
because the witness was not available for cross-examination by the
accused while permitting admission of the other tape, made by the
witness who was available at trial.'
1 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).2 ld. at 402.
31id.
4 1d. at 403, 416.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall . . . be confronted with the witnesses against
him." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .... "
6 Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
7 Id. at 402-03.
81d. at 402.
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The tapes in question were made on the day of the alleged
attempted murder approximately a minute and a half apart.9
During the first caller's telephone conversation with the 911
operator, the caller described a baldheaded man in a red shirt
running with a gun."' Shortly thereafter he began yelling "[h]e's
killing him, he's killing him, he's shooting him again," and then
warned the operator that he must "hang up because people, people
are gonna think I'm out calling the cops."" The eyewitness did not
provide the operator with identifying information nor could he be
found by the police. 12 However, the second witness who called
911 was found by police and testified at the trial.' 3
In Cortes, the court ruled that recorded 911 calls were
testimonial because such calls were made for the sole reason of
sparking police action and triggering the prosecutorial process. 4
The court reasoned that a 911 caller reporting a crime supplies
information for the purpose of "investigation, prosecution, and
potential use at a judicial proceeding; it makes no difference what
the caller believes."' 15 In so reasoning, the court relied upon the
recent United States Supreme Court case, Crawford v. Washington,
which analyzed the Confrontation Clause with respect to an
unavailable witness's out-of-court statements. 6 Specifically, the
9Id at 403, 416.
1Id. at 404.
"Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
12 Id. at 403.
'3 Id. at 416.
'
51d. at 415.
16 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004).
[Vol 21
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Court considered whether petitioner's wife's tape-recorded
statements to the police were admissible when petitioner would not
have the chance to cross-examine her because of a state marital
privilege prohibiting a spouse from testifying without the other
spouse's permission. 7
In Crawford, petitioner was charged with assault and
attempted murder of a man who allegedly raped his wife, Sylvia."
After his arrest and subsequent questioning, petitioner revealed
that he had gone to the victim's apartment to search for him. 9 At
the apartment, a fight began and petitioner stabbed the victim in
the torso and petitioner's hand was slashed.2" Petitioner claimed
self defense swearing the victim was "goin' for somethin' before,
right before everything happened."'" The police then questioned
Sylvia, whose story was similar to that of petitioner, except that
her version of the story did not account for the victim drawing a
weapon before petitioner stabbed him.22
Prior to Crawford, the Confrontation Clause was not
applied to out-of-court statements presented at trial. At that time,
the law that governed out-of-court statements was developed in
Ohio v. Roberts. 3  There, the test for admissibility of an
unavailable witness's out-of-court statement was whether such
17 Id See WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.060 (1) (2004).
8 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
'9 ld. at 38.
20 I
21 Id.
22 Id. at 39.
23 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1979).
20051
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declarations possessed an "adequate indicia of reliability. ' 24 The
Court reasoned that as long as the evidence N vas included within
the hearsay exceptions or as long as it was deemed trustworthy, the
evidence was admissible.25 In that case, defendant was charged
with forging checks and possessing stolen credit cards.26 At trial,
the prosecution sought to introduce the preliminary hearing
testimony of a witness who was unavailable to be cross-examined
at trial.27 The Court held that the evidence was properly admitted
because the defendant's counsel cross-examined the witness during
the preliminary hearing and thus the testimony "afforded 'the trier
of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement. "'28
Crawford, however, abandoned the view that the
admissibility of out-of-court statements was contingent upon the
"vagaries of the rules of evidence." 29 The Court cautioned that the
Roberts test allowed for too much judicial discretion. Such a test,
Crawford explained, permits juries to hear misleading statements,
unchallenged by the opposing counsel, simply because a judge
pronounced the evidence reliable °.3  Accordingly, Justice Scalia
warned, "[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is
24 Id. at 66.
25 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
26 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
27 Id at 58-59.
28 Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 n.12 (1972)).
29 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
30 Id. at 62.
[Vol 21
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obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty."'"
Most importantly, the Court in Crawford warned that the
Robert's test deviated from the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause which was designed to protect the colonists
against the evils of the Crown. 32 Specifically, the major evil the
Confrontation Clause targeted was the use of ex parte proceedings
as evidence against defendants.33 In addition, the Framers would
never have permitted testimonials to be used against accused
individuals if there was no opportunity of cross-examination
available.34 This can be inferred since at the time of the founding,
the common law of 1791 "conditioned admissibility of an absent
witness's examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to
cross-examine."35  These limitations are thus implied in the
Confrontation Clause.36
In overturning the Roberts test, the Court expanded the
application of the Confrontation Clause to out-of-court statements
made by third parties. Specifically, the Court held that "[w]here
testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation. 37  The Court
reasoned that the Sixth Amendment bars the admission of an out-
31 id.
32 Id at 50.33 Id.
14 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54.
3 Id. at 54.3 6 id.
2005]
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of-court testimonial statement of a witness unless the witness is
available for cross-examination or was available at an earlier time
for cross-examination. 8
Under Crawford, statements are subject to the
Confrontation Clause protections if they are considered
testimonial. 9 The Court, however, refused to elucidate an all-
inclusive definition of testimonial. Instead, the Court stated:
We leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of "testimonial."
Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and
to police interrogations. These are the modem
practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which
the Confrontation Clause was directed.4'
Since Sylvia's statement was recorded in response to a
police interrogation, the Court concluded that the statement was
testimonial in nature and fell within the Confrontation Clause. 2
Accordingly, Sylvia's statement was inadmissible because the
marital privilege foreclosed the accused from cross-examining
her.43
The Supreme Court's scant explanation of "testimonial"
has left the trial courts with little guidance.' As a result, the New
3" Id. at 68-69.
38 Id at 68.
'9 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
40 id,
41 Id (emphasis added).
42 id
43 Id
" Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
[Vol 21
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York State trial courts are divided on the definition of the term
"testimonial." In Cortes, the court adopted a blanket approach
stating that the very nature of 911 calls classifies them as
testimonial." 5 On the other hand, in State v. Moscat and State v.
Conyers46 the courts rejected this broad all-encompassing approach
and instead assumed a fact-specific analysis of the 911 call
requiring the court to look at the motive of the caller.47
In Moscat, the defendant moved in limine for an order
barring the admittance of a taped 911 call made by the accuser in a
domestic assault case.48 Both sides conceded that the complainant
was not expected to testify at the trial.49 As a result, defendant
contended that the admittance of the recording would violate his
Sixth Amendment right since he would not be able to "confront the
witnesses against him."50
The court in Moscat rejected defendant's argument and
concluded that recorded 911 tapes were not testimonial for several
reasons. First, 911 calls are initiated by citizens to police
officers. However, in a testimonial statement, it is the police who
call the citizen to be a witness. 2 Moreover, the purpose of 911
calls is to rescue an innocent bystander from danger; the purpose
45 People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 872 (N.Y Crim. Ct. 2004).
46 777 N.Y.S.2d 274, 277 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
47 Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
48 Moscat 777 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
49 Id.
50 Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
51 Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d. at 879.
52 id.
2005]
7
Feldman: Confrontation Clause
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2005
TOURO LAW REVIEW
of testimonial statements is to facilitate the prosecutorial process. 3
Finally, a 911 call is considered part of the criminal act itself rather
than part of the prosecution that ensues because the majority of
911 calls are made while the crime is still occurring."
Similarly, in Conyers, the court held that 911 tapes were
not testimonial in nature.5 In that case, the defendant was
convicted of assault and criminal possession of a weapon resulting
from a street fight between he and his brother-in law. 6 At trial, the
prosecution introduced two 911 tapes from calls made by an
eyewitness, Andrea Conyers, the mother of the defendant. 7 In
these recordings, Mrs. Conyers is heard screaming for help while
defendant is yelling "I'm going to murder you" to Mrs. Conyer's
son-in-law.5 8 Defendant sought to overturn the conviction on the
ground that since Mrs. Conyers was not called to testify at trial, his
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated. 9 The court
rejected defendant's argument and concluded that since the
witness' "intention in placing the 911 calls was to stop the assault
in progress and not to consider the legal ramifications of herself as
a witness in future legal proceedings," the 911 calls were not
testimonial in nature under Crawford and were not subject to
cross-examination in order to be admissible.60
53 Id.54 d at 880.
55 Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 277.56 Id. at 274-75.
57 Id. at 275.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 276.
60 Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
[Vol 21
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Furthermore, in State v. Isaac, the court held that 911 tapes
were not subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.6'
In that case, defendant maintained his innocence against two
misdemeanor charges of menacing.62 Because Section 60.50 of the
New York Criminal Procedure Law forbids a court from finding a
defendant guilty based solely on an admission, the State sought to
introduce two taped 911 calls made by a caller who refused to
identify herself, to corroborate an unsworn admission made by the
defendant.63 The court concluded that 911 telephone statements
were not testimonial under Crawford and were consequently
subject to the rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause. 6'
The court agreed with Judge Greenberg's analysis in Moscat,
reasoning that 911 calls are not made by callers with the intention
to prosecute; rather, they are made by callers to secure help.65
The Supreme Court established the standard: testimonial
evidence is subject to the right of confrontation. Yet, it is left to
the state courts to determine just what the Supreme Court meant by
"testimonial. Examined separately, New York state court
decisions seem to contradict one another: however, viewed
collectively they are nonetheless consistent with the broader
outline established by the federal government. Under both federal
and state law the introduction of a witnesss out-of-court
61 Isaac. No. 23398'02. 2004 WL 1389219. at *3 (N.Y. Dist Ct. June 16.
2004).
62 Id at - i.
6 Id See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. , 60.50 (McKinnev 2005).
64 Isaac. 2004 WL 1389219, at *3.
65 Id.
2005]
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testimonial statements requires the witness to be cross-examined
by the accused. Both the United States Supreme Court and the
New York trial courts refer to the importance of this "bedrock
procedural guarantee" 66 from colonial times to present American
jurisprudence.
In conclusion, a criminal defendant has a right to cross-
examine a witness's out-of-court testimonial statements under both
the federal and state constitutional right to confrontation. It
remains to be seen what types of evidence the Supreme Court
intended to include as "testimonial." The state trial courts have
already begun the process of defining testimonial, but have come
to inconsistent conclusions. Thus, a more comprehensive
definition of the meaning of "testimonial" is necessary to preserve
the original purpose of the Confrontation Clause and minimize the
wide judicial discretion the Framer's feared would occur.
Jennifer Feldman
66 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
[Vol 2 1
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United States Constitution Amendment XIV:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....
New York Constitution Article I, Section 6.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.
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